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Judicial status of illegitimate children in India: Inheritance, Succession, Adoption and Maintenance Rights

Introduction Regardless of the several judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court about the legal position of illegitimate children and their rights. The conflict in the validation of their legal right continues to exist. “Our society and judicial system do not accept children born outside of wedlock. This is  known as Nullius Filius in Latin terms, simply meaning illegitimate child.” However, with time, society gradually granted them the same status and legal right to inherit property. As per the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948: “All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection” The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 states that: “All children have the rights set out in the UNCRC. Individual children and young people shouldn’t be discriminated against when these rights are realized.” This article provides detailed information and clears the juridical status of Illegitimate children in Indian statutes like The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, The Hindu Succession Act 1956, The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956, The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, and The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 16 (3) of The Hindu Marriage Act 1955 entitles illegitimate children to receive only the property of their parents and not of any other connections. The child would only be entitled to acquire the father’s self-acquired property and not the ancestral property. However, in 2011 the Hon’ble SC in its judgment in the case of Revansiddappa & others v. Mallikarjuna & others established that “The illegitimate children have the right in their parent’s self-acquired, as well as ancestral properties under the HMA.” The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 An illegitimate child is related to the mother and each other, but not by the father. “They do not have the entitlement to inherit their father’s success.” Under the Hindu Succession Act 1956, a mother can always inherit the property of her illegitimate children and an illegitimate child can inherit the property of his or her mother or of an illegitimate brother or sister. The father has no right to claim the property of an illegitimate child. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 Under Section 20(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956, an illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is a minor. Maintaining children whether they are legitimate or illegitimate is an obligation. Our statutes ensure this, and the responsibility falls on the parents. In respect to the maintenance of illegitimate children, under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) the Madras HC while hearing a matter explicitly held that: “An illegitimate minor child is entitled to maintenance u/s 125 of CrPC. Even if we discard the fact of marriage. The minor child, as the illegitimate daughter of the respondent, would still have the entitlement to maintenance. Hence, not only the Hindu law but also the Central law in India protects the right to claim maintenance of an illegitimate child. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 Section 6 (b) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 states that the mother shall be recognized as the Natural and First Guardian of an illegitimate child. After her death, the father assumes the role of natural guardian for such a child. Further, the SC has ruled recently that a single mother case of the solitary guardian of an illegitimate child in India. Recently in 2022, the Bombay HC in the case of Dharmesh Vasantraishah v. Renuka Prakash Tiwari, held that – “A mother is the natural guardian of an illegitimate child. And the father can only claim the guardianship after the mother.” Conclusion Once Leon R. Yankwich rightly said, “There are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents.” The offspring born out of an immoral relationship with the parents has no role in the activities in which their parents indulge. One should not label these children as illegitimate at all. We should consider and regard all newborn babies the same in all aspects, irrespective of their parents’ relation. The parliament has got the recommendation to remove the term ‘illegitimate’ from all the statutes and reimplement the laws equally for all to safeguard the future of the children.  Since the consequences of the illegitimate relationship between the parents affect the children born out of such a relationship only. The society must protect the rights and social status of these children at any cost.

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Decriminalization of adultery: a step towards equality or destruction of matrimonial sanctity

Introduction Recently the offence of Adultery mentioned under section 497 of The Indian Penal Code has been decriminalized by the Hon’ble SC in the case of Joseph Shine v. Union of India 2017, striking down the previous judgments in the case of Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India 1985 and Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay 1951.The Five Judge bench of the court struck down Section 497 IPC as unconstitutional. On the grounds that it violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Additionally, the court struck down Section 198(2) CrPC only to the extent that it applies to the offense of adultery. This landmark judgment became a significant topic of debate among citizens. It garnered attention due to its association with various religious and social concerns. It was equally appreciated and criticized by the people. In favor of the judgment Section 497 of IPC is evidently discriminatory based on the sex of the spouse. This clear bias violates the fundamental right, namely, the Right to Equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. It is limited to the extramarital affairs of a married woman. This section imposes punishment exclusively on men engaging in adultery outside wedlock, even in cases of mutual and consensual activity. Notably, the section omits any punishment for women, even as abettors, treating married women differently from their male counterparts. Given that sexual intercourse involves at least two individuals. There is no legitimate reason to exempt or grant immunity to women from the culpability or punishment of adultery. The intent behind the insertion of Art. 15(3) is to uplift and strengthen the social status of a particular class in society for substantive equality. While it delivers favorable outcomes such as maternity benefits and women’s quotas. However, it cannot be utilized to claim exemption from prosecution for an offense. Further, Section 497 spreads gender and sexual stereotypes, which ultimately constitute a form of discrimination based on the sex of the spouse. Further, a nine-judge Constitutional bench in the case of K M Puttaswamy v. Union of India, stated: “sexual privacy is an integral part of the right to privacy under Article 21.” Privacy includes at least a right to make one’s own decisions about his or her intimate matters. One’s right to sexual freedom necessarily includes the right to choose a sexual partner, even when legally married to another person.. Penalizing the adulterous relationship infringes on the right to choose a sexual partner or make one’s sexual preferences. Thus, no such provision can deprive any person of their freedom to decide their sexual partner. Section 198(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) grants the husband the right to prosecute the third person with whom adultery has been committed but denies the woman her right to prosecute her husband for the offense of adultery. Moreover, law cannot penalize all immoral activities. Various practices, perceived as highly immoral and existing socially, are still prevalent in our society. Social practices like inter-caste marriage or contraception may be termed as immoral by some of the societies but the state cannot prohibit these practices by law. The Delhi HC observed in the case of Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi and stated that: “If there is any type of “morality” that can pass the test of compelling state interest, it must be “constitutional” morality and not public morality.” Even though many religions condemn and rigorously sanction the commission of adultery, it is not an integral part of any religion, and the decriminalization of adultery will not affect any kind of religious practice or faith. This sec.497 IPC treats women as chattel or the property of their husbands. This law grants husbands a dominant position compared to wives. The women stand as the ‘property of the husband’ since she has no right to sue either their adulterous husband or his paramour u/s. 497 IPC. Apart from this, sec. 497 of the Indian Penal Code deliberately lacks a sense of collective public good because it requires the offense to be committed without the consent or connivance of the husband. There will be no offense if the Husband gives consent to this relationship of his Wife with another man outside the wedlock. If the commission of offense depends upon the consent of any person, then there is no “collective good” in Sec. 497 IPC to hold that Adultery is an offense. Against the judgment The decriminalization of such a sinful act as Adultery is ultimately affecting the sanctity of marriage, society, religion, and other marriage-related institutions. This judgment of striking down Sec. 497 IPC is destructing the institution of marriage and encouraging the morale of those engaged in such offense and is going against the customs and traditions of every religion, such as in Manu smriti provided for punishment for those addicted to intercourse with other men’s wives by the punishment which causes terror, followed by banishment, in Christianity find adultery an immoral and a sin for both men and women. Even Islamic law does not support adultery. Therefore, quashing adultery as an offense is a negative derivative of the customs and practices of every religion. The Hon’ble Bench has led to an increase in the rate of Adultery cases and guards the women. The decision will harm the religious and personal rights of the society at large. The State can fix Section 497’s anomalies and make it gender-neutral through the authority granted by the Indian Constitution, but it would be incorrect to deem Section 497 of the IPC read with Section 198 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code completely invalid. Art. 15 (3) allows the State to make “special provisions” for women and children. This special power allows the state to make laws that are completely in favor of women not against them. But in the present matter, given how badly women’s standing has deteriorated even today, Lord Macaulay’s basis of discrimination while crafting Section 497 of the IPC was justified and reasonable. Decriminalizing the practice of Adultery has given the

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The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019: Ultra Vires or Intra Vires

Introduction “Anti-Terrorism is a fight between Justice and Evil, Civilisation and Savagery.” Considering this ideology, they made a significant modification to Section 35. This involved adding a provision for individuals who are or will be potential terrorists, engaging in activities that increase terrorism. The Union government passed amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act (UAPA) in 2019. This allows the designation of any organization or individual as terrorists if they: commit or participate in the acts of terrorism; prepare for acts of terror; promote terrorism, or individuals otherwise involved in terrorism. After this amendment, Several questions have been raised on the constitutionality of this amendment, questioning whether the UAPA Act 2019 is manifestly arbitrary and ultra vires the constitution of India. State’s obligation towards the citizens The group of individuals itself forms an organization. Earlier, authorities could declare only an organization as a terrorist organization. Once an organization fulfilled the grounds mentioned under Section 35 of the UAPA, authorities registered it as a terrorist organization. However, this later resulted in the formation of a new terrorist organization by the same group of people. This process degraded and limited the whole purpose of implementing the UAPA to prevent terrorism in India. The offenders took advantage of this loophole in the act to use it against the citizens of India itself. Remedies Available for the accused under UAPA Now after the amendment, any person or organization charged u/s 35, possesses several remedies too which are as follows: firstly, he or she or it may apply for denotification via application to the central government requesting to de-notify his or her or its name from the list of terrorists; Secondly, if the Central Government rejects the application after due consideration, the applicant (he/she/it) may approach to the Review Committee, constituted for reviewing the decisions related to the UAPA Act, within 1 month from the date of such refusal of an application for denotification; Thirdly, the aggrieved party may approach the Hon’ble High Court through an appeal against the verdict of the Review Committee; and Fourthly, may appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court if not satisfied by the judgment of the High Court concerned. Further, as per Section 37(3) of the act, the Chairman of the Review Committee shall be a sitting or retired judge of the High Court, hence it leaves no home for the Central Government to interfere and perform its unlimited arbitrary powers in the matter of offenses under this act. The present central government claims that the UAPA Act 2019 is neither manifestly arbitrary nor ultra vires the constitution of India. Controversial situations One major criticism of this Amendment Act, 2019 is that it makes the offense non-bailable, unilaterally categorizing a person as a terrorist without providing them a lawful opportunity to be heard. This goes against the principles of the Doctrine of Natural Justice and Audi Alteram Partem (listen to the other side). In Dev Dutt v. Union of India AIR 2008, it was held that “Any administrative having civil consequence must be made in consonance with natural justice”. Furthermore, concerning the petitions of Sajal Awasthi v. Union of India 2019 and Association for Protection of Civil Rights v. Union of India 1997, the accused were registered on the same grounds, that an individual may be identified as a terrorist without any judicial scrutiny even before the commencement of a trial, thus they have challenged this Amendment Act as being violative of the Right to Equality enshrined under article 14, Free Speech under Article 19 and Life & Liberty under article 21 of the Indian constitution. Conclusion As an anti-terrorist legislation, it plays a vital role. It is instrumental in maintaining the security and integrity of the nation. I’s purpose is to prevent and control terrorism. When authorities charge any individual or organization under this Act for any offense, given the recent amendments, obtaining bail and release from confinement becomes almost impossible. This situation automatically creates chaos and disharmony among the citizens. Therefore, scrutinizing such an act is imperative. To avoid curtailing or infringing upon the civil, political, and legal rights of individuals, one should conduct this scrutiny. It must undergo regular judicial review for the sound delivery of justice. 

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Constructive Criticism of State A Necessary & Essential Right of Any Citizen’: Calcutta High Court Orders Restoration of Retired IGP’s Security

On Monday, the Calcutta High Court ordered the State to temporarily reinstate an IGP’s security protection. He claims that the State removed the security because of his outspoken public criticism of the administration and the police apparatus. “Constructive criticism of the State is a necessary and important right of any citizen,” Justice Rajasekhar Manta’s single-judge panel stated. As is the practice with all former DIGs and IGs of Police in the State, the petitioner in this instance received a security guard. The petitioner claimed in court that the security was recently revoked without a warning. The court had previously requested a report from the Office of the DIG, West Bengal, regarding the applicable laws, police notifications, and circulars followed for providing security to the state’s retired DIGs and IGs via an order dated April 3, 2023. The court had additionally ordered that the report must also include a justification for the withdrawal of the petitioner’s security. According to the report provided by the IGP, Presidential Range, there are no regulations or guidelines for providing protection to former DIGs and IGs, and security for six high-ranking officers has been revoked since the last evaluation. Although not being listed in the report, the name of the aforementioned high officials was read out by Mr. [Prantik] Garai, learned counsel for the State, the court noted in its order. The petition further stated: “The petitioner retired from service in 2011 and has been constantly provided security from 2011 to January 2023. It is too obvious to ignore the sudden security withdrawal and the timing of it, given that the petitioner has been outspoken in his criticism of the existing police system. The court further noted that the IGP’s report in question does not address the petitioner’s plea from January 18 in which it was made plain that the petitioner continues to be perceived as being under threat. “The I.G. office has not even attempted to contact the petitioner. This Court has always recognized that the police are an autonomous branch that should operate as a unified force free from outside interference “It kept watching. The petitioner was given security, and as a temporary remedy, the court ordered the State to return it. The subject will be heard once more on May 16. Case Title: Sri Pankaj Kumar Datta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. Coram: Justice Rajasekhar Manta  

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Same-Sex Marriage Petitions Represent ‘Urban Elitist Views’, Popular Will Recognises Marriage As Exclusively Heterogenous : Centre To Supreme Court

In a second reply affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court, the Union of India once more expressed opposition to the petitions calling for same-sex marriage to be recognised legally in India. According to the counter affidavit, which asserts that marriage is “an exclusively heterogenous institution,” those who advocate for marriage equality in India merely represent “urban elitist views for the purpose of social acceptance” and that the popular will of the general public is for marriage to only be recognised among heterosexual people. The batch of petitions have been requested to be dismissed by the Supreme Court on grounds of maintainability by the Centre. The Supreme Court has announced the makeup of the five-judge panel that will hear the collection of petitions requesting legal recognition of same-sex unions in India. Legal sanctity to same-sex marriages can only be given by competent legislature, not courts The Centre has claimed that marriage is a socio-legal institution that can only be established, acknowledged, given legal sanctity, and governed by the competent legislature through an Act in accordance with Article 246 of the Indian Constitution.According to this, courts cannot establish new marriages or recognise existing ones through judicial interpretation, repealing existing marriage-related laws, or reading them down. The Centre argues that the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to same-sex marriage would amount to a “virtual judicial rewriting of an entire branch of law” and cites the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, where the court declined to create “gender neutral laws” on the grounds that they belonged to the legislative branch and that the court could not issue a mandamus ordering the Parliament to do so. It further asserts that even in those nations where same-sex marriage has been legalised, most have done so through legislative means. Marriage Equality sought by ‘urban elitists’, popular will recognises marriage only amongst heterosexual persons The declaration also argues that despite the fact that there are many different castes, subcastes, and schools of religion in India, only heterosexual couples are permitted to get married under the country’s personal laws and customs. It reads as follows: The institution of marriage is unavoidably a social construct, and as such, it is accorded sanctity by law on the basis of societal acceptance. This sanctity is attached under the various governing laws and conventions. When the “socio-legal institution of marriage” is recognised, it is argued that social acceptance and devotion to cultural ethos, shared values, and religiously diverse beliefs should not be equated with majoritarianism. The affidavit argues that the petitions merely reflect urban elitist views and cannot be compared with the appropriate legislature, which reflects the views and voices of “far wider spectrum and expands across the country” and other such pertinent considerations. It bases this claim on the sanctity attached to the institution of marriage in India, the societal ethos, cherished values in the concept of family, and other such relevant considerations. Not discriminatory to exclude same sex marriages from institution of marriage The Centre continues by arguing that excluding same-sex marriages from the institution of marriage is not discriminatory. The same is justified in accordance with the following: This is due to the fact that traditional and widely recognised socio-legal connections, such as weddings across all religions, are firmly ingrained in Indian society and are even regarded as a sacrament in all branches of Hindu law. Even in Islam, a genuine marriage can only exist between a biological male and a biological female because it is a sacred commitment. According to one argument, the situation is the same for all of India’s recognised  religions. It is argued that the Special Marriage Act of 1954 contains elements of this deeply ingrained social framework. Even the Special Marriage Act, 1954, displays a clear legislative policy of marriage between a “biological man and a biological woman and recognises elements of personal laws and customs,” it is stated, even while permitting inter-religious and inter-caste unions. According to the Centre, granting same-sex marriage equality would amount to comparing two “non-comparable classes. “It also contends that the development or approval of a brand-new social institution cannot be justified as a question of choice or right, much less a basic one. Marriage is not confined to a private sphere The Centre has also argued that marriage has never been limited to the home. There is a claim that The competent legislature, a body that is the repository of democratic   representation and reflects the will of the people, should be the only entity allowed to debate marriage regulation because it is mostly a matter of social acceptance. This argument is put up as the main justification for governmental recognition of interjurisdictional marriages. Marriage allegedly becomes the prerequisite for the State’s very existence as a result. It is evident from a reading of the challenged laws that the legislature intended to recognise marriage as a partnership between a man and a woman.

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Constructive Criticism of State A Necessary & Essential Right of Any Citizen’: Calcutta High Court Orders Restoration of Retired IGP’s Security

On Monday, the Calcutta High Court ordered the State to temporarily reinstate an IGP’s security protection. He claims that the State removed the security because of his outspoken public criticism of the administration and the police apparatus. “Constructive criticism of the State is a necessary and important right of any citizen,” Justice Rajasekhar Manta’s single-judge panel stated. As is the practice with all former DIGs and IGs of Police in the State, the petitioner in this instance received a security guard. The petitioner claimed in court that the security was recently revoked without a warning. The court had previously requested a report from the Office of the DIG, West Bengal, regarding the applicable laws, police notifications, and circulars followed for providing security to the state’s retired DIGs and IGs via an order dated April 3, 2023. The court had additionally ordered that the report must also include a justification for the withdrawal of the petitioner’s security. According to the report provided by the IGP, Presidential Range, there are no regulations or guidelines for providing protection to former DIGs and IGs, and security for six high-ranking officers has been revoked since the last evaluation. Although not being listed in the report, the name of the aforementioned high officials was read out by Mr. [Prantik] Garai, learned counsel for the State, the court noted in its order. The petition further stated: “The petitioner retired from service in 2011 and has been constantly provided security from 2011 to January 2023. It is too obvious to ignore the sudden security withdrawal and the timing of it, given that the petitioner has been outspoken in his criticism of the existing police system. The court further noted that the IGP’s report in question does not address the petitioner’s plea from January 18 in which it was made plain that the petitioner continues to be perceived as being under threat. “The I.G. office has not even attempted to contact the petitioner. This Court has always recognized that the police are an autonomous branch that should operate as a unified force free from outside interference “It kept watching. The petitioner was given security, and as a temporary remedy, the court ordered the State to return it. The subject will be heard once more on May 16. Case Title: Sri Pankaj Kumar Datta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. Coram: Justice Rajasekhar Manta

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Stopped Payment of Cheque: Can the Drawer Be Held Liable Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act?

A stopped payment on a cheque is typically requested when the cheque has been lost or declared missing. However, sometimes the drawer of the cheque may attempt to avoid his debt or liability by using the “stopped payment” as a means of deception. In these cases, the drawer may issue a cheque with the knowledge that it will not be honoured upon presentation, and attempt to create circumstances in which the bank will return the cheque with endorsements such as “stopped payment,” “refer to drawer,” or “A/C closed.”   Dishonour of cheque is not an offence in itself. In order for dishonour of a cheque to be considered an offense, the following conditions must be met: Ø  The cheque must be drawn by a drawer. Ø  The cheque must be in discharge of some liability. Ø  The cheque must be presented to the drawee bank. Ø  The bank must return the cheque unpaid due to insufficient funds. Ø  The cheque must be presented within three months (previously six months) of the date it was drawn or within its period of validity, whichever is earlier. Ø  Within thirty days of receiving memo of the returned cheque from the bank, the payee must serve notice demanding payment of the money. Ø  The drawer must fail to pay the money within 15 days of receiving the demand notice. It is important to note that if the drawer pays the debt within 15 days, there will be no offense. Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the offense of dishonour of a cheque is committed when the drawer fails to pay the debt within 15 days. If found guilty, the person may be punishable with imprisonment for a term of up to two years, or a fine of up to twice the amount of the cheque, or both. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is silent on the issue of stopped payments, but a plain reading of the section makes it clear that it only contemplates two contingencies: insufficiency of funds or an amount that exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from the account. No third contingency is mentioned in the section, and the specific wording of the section eliminates the possibility of any other contingencies. However, there have been various judgments on this matter, and Indian courts have addressed this aspect in relation to the dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Landmark Judgments: In the case of M/s. Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v. M/s. Indian Technologists & Engineers (Electronics) Pvt. Ltd. and another, Appeal (crl.)  124 of 1996, a cheque was presented by the complainant through his bank, with the promise from the accused that it would be honoured upon presentation. However, the said cheque was dishonoured with the banker’s endorsement dated 29-11-1990 which stated “1. referred to drawer. 2. instructions for stopping payment and stamped. 3. exceeds arrangements”. The appellant filed complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, alleging that the accused had dishonoured a cheque due to insufficiency of funds in their accounts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “It would thus be clear that when a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for payment of any amount of money to another person out of the amount for the discharge of the debt in whole or in part or other liability is returned by the bank with the endorsement like (1) in this case, “I refer to the drawer” (2) “instructions for stoppage of payment” and (3) “stamp exceeds arrangement”, it amounts to dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 of the Act. On issuance of the notice by the payee or the holder in due course after dishonour, to the drawer demanding payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of such a notice, if he does not pay the same, the statutory presumption of dishonest intention, subject to any other liability, stands satisfied”.   In the case of MMTC Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd., Appeal (crl.) 1173-1174 of 2001, The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be made not only when a cheque is dishonoured due to insufficient funds or if the amount of the cheque exceeds the amount in the account, but also when the drawer of the cheque instructs their bank to “stop payment” on the cheque. However, if the accused can show that there were sufficient funds in their account to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of presentation and that the stop-payment notice was issued for valid reasons, then the offense under Section 138 would not be made out.

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10 MOST IMPORTANT JUDGMENTS UNDER ARBITRATION LAW IN INDIA

10 MOST IMPORTANT JUDGMENTS UNDER ARBITRATION LAW IN INDIA Due to its effectiveness, efficiency, and speed, arbitration is becoming a more popular form of alternative conflict resolution than court-based litigation. With the goal of modernising Indian Arbitration Law and bringing it in line with the best international practices, the (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) was modelled after the UNCITRAL framework of legislation.   The Supreme Court of India (SC) and other High Courts (HC) issued a number of notable rulings in 2021 that addressed the legal status and applicability of the Arbitration Act’s provisions. In order to guarantee that the alternative dispute resolution procedures outlined in Indian Law adhere to international norms, the Indian Government also modified the Arbitration Act.   Some Of the Important Judgments are: N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors, SLP (Civil) Nos.13132-13133 of 2020)   Issue: Whether an arbitration agreement would be void, ineffective, or unenforceable if the underlying contract was not stamped in accordance with the applicable stamp legislation?   The SC ruled that even if the substantive contract is not admissible in evidence or that it cannot be implemented due to non-payment of stamp duty, in such cases the arbitration agreement would not be considered void, unenforceable, or non-existent. However, due to a contradiction with an earlier ruling, the SC referred the aforementioned issue to be addressed by a Constitution Bench of Five Judges.   Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.,SLP (CIVIL) No.665 of 2021   Issue: Whether a delay of more than 120 days can be condoned in case of filing of appeal against the order?   The SC ruled that a delay in submitting an appeal against a court order under the Arbitration Act may be excused even after 120 days. However, only in rare circumstances may such a delay be excused.   Inox Renewables Limited v. Jayesh Electricals Limited, SLP (C) No.29161 of 2019   Issue: Whether by mutual consent can the parties to arbitration change the seat of arbitration.   The SC ruled that changing the “venue” of arbitration by both parties’ consent will also change the juridical “seat” of arbitration.   PASL Wind Solutions Private Limited v. GE Power Conversion India Private Limited, SLP (CIVIL) NO.3936 OF 2021   Issue: Whether two Indian parties can agree on a foreign seat of arbitration?   The SC held that two Indian parties may select a foreign arbitral seat and that those who pick such a foreign seat may seek temporary relief from Indian courts.   Rahul S Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and Ors, SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL NOS. 7965-7966/2020   In order to expeditiously carry out decree execution, the SC issued guidelines that all executing courts must abide by. The guidelines noted that an executing court must resolve the execution proceedings within 6 (six) months of the date of filing, and that this deadline may only be extended by providing written justification for the delay.   Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd, COMM ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 4466 OF 2020   Issue: Whether the arbitral tribunal can go beyond the terms of the contract between the parties?   An arbitral decision that violated the provisions of the parties’ contract was overturned by the Bombay High Court. Unless the parties mutually agree to allow the arbitrator to settle a dispute by applying what they deem to be “fair and reasonable,” the Bombay High Court ruled that the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is restricted to the agreement and that they can pass an order that may be the subject of reference.   Interdigital Technology Corporation & Ors. v. Xiaomi Corporation& Ors., CS(COMM) 295/2020   The Delhi High Court issued a precedent-setting order prohibiting the implementation of a foreign court’s rulings. Interdigital Technology Corporation filed a lawsuit in the Delhi High Court asking for an injunction against Xiaomi Corporation for allegedly infringing on its patents.   Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd., CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8343-8344 OF 2018   The SC ruled that a non-signatory who is functioning as the arbitration agreement’s signatory’s alter ego would be subject to the enforcement of a foreign award. The SC concluded that being a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement is not a reason for Indian courts to refuse enforcement of a foreign judgement, underscoring the limited grounds on which enforcement of a foreign award may be refused by courts.   DLF Homes Developers Ltd. v. Rajapura Homes Pvt. Ltd. and Anr, ARBITRATION PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 17 OF 2020   The SC ruled that even though the parties have an arbitration agreement, the court may nevertheless conduct a prima facie review and deny a request to send a matter to arbitration if it does not fall under the terms of the arbitration agreement.   Tata Capital Finance Ltd. v. Shri Chand Construction and Apartment Pvt. Ltd., AO(OS) 40/2020 and CM No. 15441/2020   The Delhi High Court ruled that an arbitration agreement that gives one party unequal authority to end the arbitration process on its own would be legally unenforceable. Additionally, a clause in an arbitration agreement that directs one party’s claims to arbitration while leaving the other party’s claims open to another remedy would be illegal under the law.   Reference: https://www.mondaq.com/india/arbitration-dispute-resolution/1156308/arbitration-law-in-india-key-judgments-and-updates-for-the-year-2021   https://www.barandbench.com/columns/40-important-judgments-on-arbitration-2021   https://blog.ipleaders.in/important-judgments-arbitration-passed-2021/ https://www.barandbench.com/columns/50-important-arbitration-judgements-january-may-2022   Need Free Legal Advice or Assistance Online? For any Dispute Resolution (ADR) related matter, please Post Your Requirement anonymously and get free proposals OR find the Best Dispute Resolution (ADR) Lawyers and book a free appointment directly.

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THE CONCEPT OF MAINTENANCE UNDER HINDU LAW

The term maintenance is defined as providing financial support to the dependents.  Maintenance is governed differently by different religions but there are secular laws in terms of maintenance which are applicable to all the citizens of India irrespective of their religion which are as following: – Special Marriage Act,1954 Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Maintenance under various laws are: – Section 18 read with 23,24,25,26 of Hindu Law – Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 Section 20(1)(d) and 20(6) under the Protection of women from Domestic violence Act, 2005   MAINTENANCE UNDER HINDU LAW Maintenance under Hindu law is governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Hindu Marriage act is a code which provides for the rights, liabilities and obligations that arises out of a marriage between two Hindus. Maintenance is provided under Section 24, 25 and 26 of the Act. The sections being gender-neutral provisions, entitle both the husband and the wife to raise a claim for maintenance on the ground that the applicant does not have a sustainable income and is unable to maintain himself or herself. In Lalit Mohan v. Tripta Devi (1988)1 the Jammu & Kashmir High Court held that the husband did not have an independent income. Hence, the wife was ordered to pay Rs. 500/- as court expenses, Rs. 100/- per month as maintenance pendente lite and permanent alimony to the husband, from the date of application till his death or remarriage. Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act talks about the provision of maintenance ‘pendente lite’. In this, the court directs the respondent to pay the expenses that arise during the proceeding along with the payment of a monthly amount which is reasonable and is in accordance with the income of both the parties. Section 25 of the Act elaborates the provisions on ‘maintenance’ and ‘permanent alimony’. In this, the court may direct the respondent to pay the applicant a fixed amount on a monthly basis or a lumpsum, considering the income of the respondent. Section 26 of the Act states that the court may pass interim orders with regard to the custody, maintenance and education of the minor children, from time to time. Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA) was specially enacted to amend and codify Hindu laws relating to adoption and maintenance.  Section 18 read with section 23 provides for the maintenance laws under HAMA. They state the pre-requisites for deciding the quantum of maintenance which is to be paid. Section 18 states that a Hindu wife has a right to be maintained by her husband. She is also entitled to make a claim to live separately without losing her claim to maintenance. However, the right to maintenance and living separately would not be available if the wife has been unchaste or has converted to another religion. When we look at the both HMA and HAMA, the interplay of maintenance was taken into consideration by the Supreme Court in Chand Dhawan v Jawaharlal Dhawan2. Here the Supreme Court held that Section 18 (1) of HAMA provides the wife with the right to claim maintenance during her lifetime and Section 18 (2) provides the wife with the right to live separately without having to give up the claim for maintenance. However, under HMA the wife does not have the right to permanent alimony under Section 25 till the divorce petition is approved but can claim maintenance pendente lite, which is dependent on the pendency of the petition. HAMA also provides for the maintenance of a widowed daughter-in-law by the father-in-law. Section 19 of HAMA states the requisites for the claim of maintenance which are: – She is unable to maintain herself out of her own independent income or other property She has no property of her own or is unable to maintain herself from The estate of her husband, father or mother Her son or daughter Section 20 of HAMA provides for maintenance of children and aged parents. It also places an obligation on a Hindu male to maintain his unmarried daughter, if she is not able to maintain herself out of her income or other property. In Abhilasha v Parkash & Ors.3 the Supreme Court pointed out the obligation of father to maintain his unmarried daughter under the HAMA but under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., the claim for maintenance is available till the child attains majority. However, if the unmarried daughter is suffering from any physical or mental abnormality, or injury and hence, is unable to maintain herself, then the father is obligated to maintain her even after the attainment of majority.   SECTION 125 OF Cr.P.C. Chapter IX of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for the maintenance of wife, children and parents. Maintenance under this section can be claimed by eligible individuals irrespective of their religion. It can be claimed under two conditions: – The husband/father/son has sufficient means, and He further neglects to maintain his wife/children/parents, who is/are unable to maintain herself/themselves. The Amendment Act of 2001 further brought in a series of changes. Before the Amendment Act of 2001, there was a fixed amount of Rs. 500 being awarded as maintenance. Looking at the inflation rates, this fixed amount was removed. The Amendment also brought in the provision for interim maintenance so that the dependent wife/children/parents do not have to wait for indefinite periods to receive maintenance. Another prevalent issue is the question of maintenance when the parties are in a live-in relationship for a long period of time.  In the case Chanmuniya v Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr4 the Supreme Court held that when a man and woman have cohabited for a considerable amount of time such a woman will be entitled to maintenance. ISSUES After looking at these provisions for maintenance, a few issues have come to the notice of courts. Overlapping jurisdiction: Overlapping jurisdiction here refers to a situation where a

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